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Abstract 
This paper examines the dynamics of manufacturing employment change in 13 EU countries 
between the years 1978 and 1996 mainly through  the utilisation of shift-share techniques. 
Despite the momentum that European integration gained over this period the key finding here 
is that the geography of manufacturing employment has remained almost intact. Processes 
operating at European scale appear to have the largest impact on labour outcomes in each 
member state, while there is little deviation from the widespread declining trends. Spatial 
stability is reinforced even further through the homogeneity of several national industrial 
structures. In a ddition, the moderate increase in the industrial specialisation of the 
participating economies and the localisation tendencies of a few traditional sub-sectors pose 
little if any threat to the stability of the present map of manufacturing distribution. This 
evidence suggests that, contrary to some political rhetoric, the integration process has not, at 
least so far, adversely affected the relative competitiveness of manufacturing in either 
peripheral or core countries. 
 
   2
1 Introduction 
During the past two  decades the process of European integration gained significant 
momentum through the establishment of the Single Market and the steps taken towards the 
Monetary Union. Although, in principle, this evolution is expected to be highly beneficial for 
all the participating countries there is still much uncertainty in relation to the actual spatial 
outcomes. In advanced economies, such as the UK, several fears have been expressed that the 
abolition of trade barriers and the free movement of capital will have negative implications on 
their industrial activity. On the other hand, in peripheral states there is much scepticism 
regarding their ability to take advantage of the opportunities offered by economic integration. 
The main perceived danger is that the gap that s eparates them from their advanced 
counterparts may become wider, as the latter are thought to be better adjusted, in terms of 
economic and institutional structures, human capital or technology, to the new conditions of 
growth. 
 
The evidence provided by economic geographers suggests that both scenarios are possible. 
Undoubtedly, there are various factors that promote the concentration of production in the 
European periphery. Other things being equal, lower wages and improved accessibility to the 
major markets, which are situated in the North, increase the attractiveness of the South as an 
industrial location. Moreover, the EU regional assistance has a similar effect. It represents a 
significant transfer of resources that has the potential to play a catalytic role in the upgrade of 
the physical and social infrastructure in lagging areas. 
 
However, most analysts are rather hesitant to argue in favour of this prospect (see amongst 
others Hudson, 1997) although they do not entirely dismiss it. Krugman and Venables (1990) 
are quick to point out that lower wages and better market accessibility are not sufficient 
conditions to raise the relative competitiveness of southern economies. In the presence of 
substantial economies of scale and moderate trade barriers the northern member states stand 
better chances to pull additional industrial activity there. This happens because economies of 
scale encourage the concentration of production in a single location, while moderate barriers 
to trade favour core locations that offer the optimum, not just improved, market access. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that although the EU regional policy in general grants a 
privileged position to the South, the same does not apply to the component that focuses on the 
support of the productive sector. Martin (1998) demonstrates that the EU expenditures per 
capita for this purpose are almost evenly distributed across Objective 1 and 2 regions. The   3
latter group includes mostly northern European areas in industrial decline. In addition, the EU 
initiatives are further undermined by the difficulty of peripheral states to absorb all the 
funding that are allocated, while national regional policies are important too. Advanced 
countries have the ability to allocate far more resources to their backward regions in 
comparison to their Mediterranean counterparts. Apart from that, Hadjimichalis (1994) states 
that the EU policies suffer from a clear north-central European socio-economic bias. Southern 
peculiarities are usually not taken into account during their design or implementation and thus 
the policies are less effective in triggering economic growth in that part of Europe. Finally, 
firms in the periphery face added difficulties in order to compete successfully in the Single 
Market. Smallbone et al (1999), for instance, show that UK small and medium sized 
enterprises in the clothing and food sectors adapt more easily to the new business 
environment than Portuguese firms due to their longer exposure to external competition in 
their domestic market. 
 
In such a context, the present paper aims to shed some light on the spatial effects of the 
integration process by examining the dynamics of employment change in 13 EU states and 28 
manufacturing sub-sectors during the period 1978-1996. Manufacturing has a central role in 
the relevant debate, since it accounts for the largest part of international trade and includes 
several relatively footloose industries. The geographical coverage is not ideal, however, as 
will become clear, interstate analysis can offer some important advantages. 
 
In the next section some methodological issues and an outline of the available data are 
presented. This is followed by the decomposition of manufacturing employment decline using 
shift-share techniques. The exploration of the evolution of industrial specialisation and 
sectoral dispersion patterns is a task for section four, while the study concludes with a 
summary of the main findings and the discussion of the questions that arise in relation to 
them. 
 
2 Methods and data 
Undoubtedly, a simple and undifferentiated measure of employment is not a perfect indicator 
of industrial performance. The great variation among the type of jobs (full-time, part-time, 
seasonal, unpaid, etc.) that are aggregated together in official statistics sometimes obscures 
regional comparisons. Similarly, the comparability of international data is often limited due to 
discrepancies in the way (censuses, surveys, etc.) that they are collected. Leaving aside these   4
two issues, a more serious consideration is that employment does not always reflect 
accurately the magnitude or the dynamics of manufacturing sector. In areas where 
productivity is low or labour intensive industries are predominant, large numbers of workers 
do not necessarily indicate a sizeable manufacturing activity. Furthermore, the evolution of 
employment frequently deviates from the trends that other indicators, such as fixed capital 
stock and output, display (Melachroinos and Spence, 1997). This is more so during periods of 
intense industrial restructuring or new technology implementation, when job losses occur 
despite the expansion of the manufacturing sector. 
 
Although the above points are well documented in the literature, employment remains a 
widespread measure of industrial dynamism. An important reason behind this tendency is that 
the generation of new jobs is an integral aspect of regional economic development, since it 
facilitates the mobilisation of human resources (labour, knowledge, skills, etc.) in the 
production process. In addition, most of the previous critique can be just as easily applied to 
most other indicators. A single variable, by definition, can offer only a limited view on 
multifaceted phenomena like industrial change. Ideally, the parallel examination of several 
variables may provide an answer to this problem, and indeed there are some noteworthy 
examples of this approach in the context of the EU regional disparities (see for instance 
Dunford, 1993; 1994; 1996). Nevertheless, in the case of international  comparisons this 
research avenue is subject to arbitrary assumptions. Output and investment figures have to be 
converted into a common currency, something that is highly problematic considering the 
deficiencies of the available conversion factors.
1 To this extent, employment has a significant 
advantage over other manufacturing indicators, since it avoids the conversion obstacle. 
 
The spatial coverage of the analysis is another issue that needs some discussion. Clearly, 
comparisons at country level conceal a great deal of geographical variance. Economic 
disparities in the European Union are by far sharper among regions than member states 
(Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996; Cappelen et al, 1999). Even so, it could be argued that from 
a political perspective that inequalities between countries are still significant. The key 
decisions that affect the future shape and policies of the European Union cannot be taken 
unless a consensus is achieved among the participating national governments. The latter are as 
much interested in the overall performance of their entire economy as that of individual areas 
and act accordingly. Apart from that, it should be noted that the size of many EU countries is 
similar to that of US states, and hence an interstate focus can facilitate comparisons between   5
the two areas, since a significant amount of geographic research in the US is carried out at this 
level. To the extent that changes in the spatial manufacturing structure in the US provide a 
guide for the prospective evolutions in the European industry, such comparisons are 
particularly fruitful (see among others Krugman, 1991; Neven and Gouyette, 1995; Heim, 
1997; Martin and Tyler, 2000). Last but not least, the amount and quality of information about 
industrial structure are much higher at national rather than regional levels. Consequently, 
research focusing on member states can unveil the importance of industry mix and other 
factors (competitive shift, for instance) that often cannot be examined properly in a regional 
framework due to the limited availability of data (Armstrong, 1995; Fagerberg and 
Verspagen, 1996; Martin and Tyler, 2000). 
 
Shift-share is the main method of analysis utilised in this paper. According to this framework, 
the employment change (DE
s) in a member state between two points in time 0 and t can be 
viewed as the outcome of three effects (see equation 1).  The first is the EU effect, which 
represents the expected gains or losses (SE
s
i0(e)) if total employment in the member state 
(Se
s
i0) had followed the EU growth rate (e). The second is the structural effect, which reflects 
the hypothetical employment change (SE
s
i0(ei – e)) if every manufacturing industry (i) in the 
member state had grown at the EU sectoral rate (ei). It is evident that the component will be 
positive in countries specialising in activities expanding faster (or declining slower) than the 
rest manufacturing sector (ei > e) at European level. Finally, the third is the competitive effect 
which captures the spatial variation in the growth rates of individual manufacturing sectors 
(e
s
i – ei). The component is positive if the manufacturing sub-sectors are growing faster (or 
declining slower) in the state than the rest EU (e
s











i – ei) 
 
Despite its simplicity equation (1) has been a widely used tool for the empirical 
decomposition of manufacturing employment change. In the British regional context, for 
instance, an indicative and certainly inexhaustive list of studies utilising the classic shift-share 
model includes the works of Fothergill and Gudgin (1982), Frost and Spence (1991), and Keil 
(1997). Nevertheless, it should be also mentioned that several reservations regarding various 
aspects of the method have been raised over time. According to Loveridge and Selting (1998) 
the main points of the critique can be summarised in terms of the lack of theoretical content,   6
data aggregation problems, weighting bias, instability of the competitive effect, and the 
interdependence of the industry mix and competitive effects. 
 
The absence of an underlying theory for the model is the essence of the first, and arguably, 
most serious problem. Employment evolution is ascribed to the three components without 
much explanation (especially in the case of the competitive effect) offered about the spatial 
variation of growth rates. This is a valid point and numerous efforts have been made to 
address it, mostly through the introduction of additional variables (output, imports, exports, 
etc.) into the model. Thus,  Massey and Meegan (1979) modified the original shift-share 
equation in order to account for the impact of rising output and labour productivity on 
manufacturing job trends. Similarly, Markusen et al (1991) included in their analysis 
international trade data as well, in an attempt to throw some light on the first two components 
of expression (1). A more elaborate framework, based on a regional input model, was 
provided by Casler (1989), who linked shift-share components to factor demand for labour. 
Finally, Graham and Spence (1998; 2000) developed further this framework by incorporating 
two fundamental mechanisms behind employment evolution, changes in output demand and 
the technological attributes of production, into the method. 
 
In this paper, a strong preference is expressed for the classic shift-share model, although 
certain modifications are allowed as a response to some of the remaining criticisms. This 
decision can be supported on several grounds. On the one hand, in this way the previously 
mentioned conversion obstacle, which is associated with other manufacturing indicators in the 
European context is avoided. On the other hand, the impact of additional variables, such as 
labour productivity, is not at all clear. Labour productivity improvements do not necessarily 
result in job losses. Employment levels may be preserved or even new positions created as 
technical change enables local industries to become more competitive and increase their 
market shares and output (Markusen et al, 1991). Lastly, the main aim here is to depict, with 
clarity, the spatial dynamics of manufacturing employment change in the EU. Shift-share 
analysis serves this purpose satisfactorily, despite its lack of an underlying theoretical 
framework. 
 
Returning to the remaining concerns about the method, it has to be admitted that data 
aggregation poses a significant limitation. Highly aggregated data may result in the 
overestimation of the competitive effect, since what is attributed to differential growth rates   7
may in fact be the outcome of favourable industrial mix (strong presence of sub-sectors that 
expand fast everywhere). Nevertheless, the degree of aggregation applied is largely an issue 
of information availability. From this viewpoint, it is difficult to criticise the method for the 
absence of relevant data at finer industrial detail. For this analysis, the level of aggregation is 
the lowest permitted by data availability and, as it will be demonstrated shortly, the sub-
sectoral coverage is quite detailed. 
 
The instability of the competitive effect and the interdependence of the structural and 
differential components are two additional themes that have caused concern in the literature. 
The temporal variation of the competitive effect entails that employment projections based on 
shift-share results are particularly precarious. While accepting this point, the advocates of the 
method are quick to emphasise its analytical utility if only for exposing this instability 
(Fothergill and Gudgin, 1979). Similarly, the interdependence of the two components is an 
inherent problem considering the difficulty of isolating differential performance from 
industrial structure. Subsequent research has shown that the classic model is by no means an 
inferior predecessor of more sophisticated models that were developed in relation to this issue 
(Loveridge and Selting, 1998). 
 
Last, but not least, the values of the industry mix and competitive components are largely 
affected by the choice of employment weights (SE
s
i0). A common practice is to apply the 
industrial shares of the base year. However, during longer periods industrial composition may 
be altered dramatically (especially during recession times) and thus results will not reflect the 
adjustment. Barff and Knight (1988) have proposed the annual estimation of shift-share 
parameters, as a solution to this problem. The yearly figures are then added in order to 
calculate the long run structural and differential effects. This dynamic shift-share model is the 
version that is adopted here. 
 
The necessary data for the calculation of the shift-share components come from the OECD 
(1998) STAN database for industrial analysis, which contains information on the number of 
people engaged in manufacturing in 13 EU states. (Ireland and Luxembourg are the two 
missing states, while the German data refer only to the former Federal Republic of Germany.) 
This number includes not only salary earners but also self-employed, owner proprietors and 
unpaid family workers. The level of detail is quite impressive as 49 ISIC (revision 2) 
manufacturing branches are covered over the period 1970-1997. However, due to gaps in the   8
annual time series and spatial coverage, the analysis here is based on the employment 
evolution in 28 3-digit ISIC sectors between the years 1978 and 1996. The omitted branches 
represent finer ISIC classifications (4-digit), and thus only the level of disaggregation is 
affected, not the total manufacturing figures. Moreover, in order to avoid the further reduction 
of the analytical time span, it was decided to replace some missing values by interpolation. 
Thus, jobs in Austria and Germany at 3-digit industry level in 1996 have been estimated by 
assuming that the share of sub-sectors in the employment of the 2-digit industry to which they 
belong (provided by the database) has remained the same as that of the previous year. Sub-
sectoral employment in Belgium and Italy for the periods 1993-1996 and 1995-1996 
respectively has been calculated in a similar fashion.
2 
 
3 Decomposing employment decline in European manufacturing 
The results of the dynamic shift-share analysis between the years 1978 and 1996 are presented 
in table 1. It is useful to pay some attention to the second column of the same table before the 
components of employment change are examined in detail. At a first glance the geographical 
distribution of manufacturing in the EU appears extremely uneven. Germany and the other 
large economies (France, Italy, Spain, and the UK) accounted in 1978 for approximately 4/5 
of the people engaged in the sector. Similarly, in the European North (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK) was concentrated 
more than 70% of all manufacturing jobs. However, the enormous variation in state size 
should be also taken into consideration. Indeed, if an experiment similar to that of Dollar and 
Wolff (1993) for the OECD countries is conducted, it is evident that the spatial distribution of 
manufacturing jobs resembles more or less that of population (figure 1). With the notable 
exception of Germany (where population figures refer to the entire country, while 
manufacturing data cover only the western part of it), the magnitude of industrial activity in 
each member state seems to be in line with the likely domestic demand. In this light, the 
inequalities in manufacturing allocation are rather small, although of course there are 
countries (Greece, for instance), which are significantly less industrialised than the rest. 
 
Leaving aside the issue of distribution, table 1  also reveals that employment declined 
dramatically over the examined period. At the European level more than 1/5 of the available 
positions in the sector were lost in just 18 years. However, it should be noted that the decrease 
in the number of jobs is not associated with a catholic industrial decline. As other studies have 
demonstrated manufacturing fixed capital stock and output continued to grow at a slow but   9
steady pace throughout the period (Melachroinos and Spence, 2001). It is rather the 
specialisation of European industry in activities where labour-saving process innovations are 
dominant and its parallel weaknesses in sectors where product innovation is prevailing that 
trigger job losses (Pianta and Vivareli, 1999). In any case, a cursory glance at the data shows 
that the negative trends were universal, although there was some variation in the rates. The 
UK (32.6%), Belgium (30%) and France (28.6%) were the states that experienced the most 
acute employment reduction, while the losses in Finland, Austria, Spain, Italy, Greece and 
Sweden ranged around the EU average. In contrast, the fall in labour figures was less striking 
in the Netherlands and Germany (16.4% and 15.5% respectively) and almost negligible in 
Denmark (1%) and Portugal (7.5%). Nonetheless, these differences are not extreme, while the 
two countries deviating most from the EU average are not sizeable. Moreover, small 
economies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden) 
and the South (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) performed only slightly better than large 
economies and the North. As a result the pattern of manufacturing allocation across Europe 
has remained roughly the same (compare the last two charts in figure 1). 
 
Apart from the above, another noteworthy finding is that the EU effect accounts for the 
largest part of employment change. Except for Portugal, Denmark and the UK, the absolute 
values of the EU component are approximately two (Greece) to forty-three (Spain) times 
higher than that of competitive shift. The same applies to the absolute impact of industry mix, 
which is everywhere at least four times lower than that of proportional shift.
3 Consequently, 
national labour outcomes are mainly determined by EU trends, something that reinforces the 
observed spatial inertia. It may be the case, that processes taking place at the European scale 
(production rationalisation, capital intensification, closure of outdated plants, etc.) are perhaps 
the major driving forces behind employment outcomes in each member state. 
 
By examining the geographical variation of the remaining shift-share components it is clear 
that industrial structure had a substantial positive effect only in Denmark and the Netherlands, 
while its impact was most adverse in the lagging economies (Portugal and Greece). In 
addition, the industry mix was certainly more favourable in the North than the South (1.2% 
and -2.9% respectively), although it hardly had any influence on labour outcomes. On the 
other hand, the competitive component demonstrated higher values and greater spatial 
fluctuation. In Portugal (24.5%) and Denmark (18.3%) the performance of individual 
manufacturing industries was far superior compared to elsewhere and almost compensated for   10
the severe EU effect. However, the same did not happen in the remaining countries, where the 
deviation from European sectoral trends was either moderate (Greece, Germany, Italy) or 
negligible (Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Spain, Finland). In the UK (-13.7%), France ( -
7.2%) and Belgium ( -6.8%) in particular, the shift was substantially negative and this 
exacerbated job losses. Finally, smaller economies (5.8%) and the South (5.4%) benefited 
from the improved employment record of manufacturing industries present there in 
comparison to large economies (-1.2%) and the North ( -2.1%). Nevertheless, it should be 
repeated that these figures represent only but a fraction of the EU effect. 
 
Results such as the above indicate that perhaps the level of detail that is lost in regional 
studies due the absence of disaggregated data may be less significant than usually thought. 
However, this is far from a definite conclusion, since the smaller the spatial scale the larger 
tends to be the structural differentiation.
4 Nonetheless, the low values of this component can 
be attributed to two possible reasons. They either reflect the absence of marked differences in 
the growth rates of individual sub-sectors or result from geographically uniform 
manufacturing structures across the EU. In the same vein, the spatial variation of the 
competitive effect is either associated with migration movements of manufacturing activities 
within Europe or derives from national differences in the pace of labour decline. 
 
In respect of the first issue, the low impact of the structural component can be only partly 
attributed to the relatively homogeneous industrial trends prevailing at the EU level during the 
period 1978-1996. With the exception of printing & publishing (3420) and plastic products 
(3560), employment change was negative in the remaining 26 3-digit ISIC branches (table 2). 
Nonetheless, the sectoral variation in the proportion of jobs lost (ranging from 8.5% of the 
positions available in 1978 for other chemicals to 49.8% for iron & steel) was not that small 
to produce a near zero industry mix effect in several countries alone. Thus, a certain degree of 
similarity should be also prevailing among the national manufacturing bases. The extent of 
this spatial uniformity and its evolution over the past two decades will be explored further in 
the subsequent section. 
 
In relation to the second point, the evidence presented in table 2 suggests that manufacturing 
migration movements within the EU have so far been minimal. In eight member states and 
four large groupings of economies (North, South, large and small), fewer than five out of 28 
sub-sectors recorded any employment growth. Furthermore, the gains were insubstantial,   11
ranging from 1.3% (Austria) to 9.2% (Netherlands) of the total job loss. The situation was 
somewhat different in Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and Greece. However, even there 
no more than 10 industries generated new positions, while apart from Denmark and Portugal 
the increases did not even compensate for 1/5 of the employment loss. Last but not least, the 
job-creating sectors were not the same everywhere. Although in total 20 industries expanded 
in at least one country, only four (plastic products, printing & publishing, furniture & fixtures 
and professional goods) achieved this in more than five states. Consequently, although there 
are some sectors in each country that create new jobs, it is difficult to argue that their growth 
is either the direct outcome or the cause of industrial decline elsewhere. The gains are simply 
not analogous to the losses. On the contrary, it is safer to view spatial disparities in the impact 
of the competitive effect (which again in absolute figures is not sizeable) as the product of 
national differences in the pace of decline. 
 
The findings of this section paint a picture in which it is hard to identify winners or losers in 
the new integrated European economy. The geography of manufacturing employment has 
remained almost intact, while any shift from the EU labour trends seems to stem from milder 
declining rates in some areas (particularly the small economies and the South). Instead of 
engaging in head to head competition, national industrial structures appear to strive to 
eliminate the negative implications of the common pressures to which they are exposed. 
Inevitably, some of them are inherent aspects of the integration process (improved access for 
other EU firms in domestic markets, for instance), and thus a limited case can be made that 
even the decline differentials are the result of intra-EU competition. However, many other 
pressures are external to the system (globalisation, reduction of trade barriers with the US and 
Japan, increased competition from NICs in world markets, etc.). The universal deterioration in 
the employment record of all but two manufacturing sub-sectors is perhaps a reminder of just 
how powerful these latter processes are. 
 
Finally, firm or plant relocations hidden in the aggregated numbers of official statistics cannot 
be ruled out, while arguably competition may not take the form of job growth, but that of 
uneven fixed capital and output expansion. Nonetheless, it is rather unlikely these elements 
will dictate spatial labour outcomes. Job transfers cannot possibly have a significant impact in 
a context where the vast majority of industries shed labour virtually in every member state. 
Similarly, it is reassuring that, for total manufacturing, the geographical distribution of fixed 
capital stock and value-added among the EU countries has been altered only slightly during   12
the 1978-1994 period (Melachroinos and Spence, 2001). Undoubtedly, more research is 
necessary to check whether this conclusion applies also to individual sub-sectors as in the 
case of employment examined here. 
 
4 Industrial specialisation and sectoral dispersion 
The discussion in the previous section has raised a number of important issues concerning the 
mechanics of employment change in European manufacturing. An implicit finding that 
deserves to be explored further is the degree of differentiation among national industrial 
structures. If it is low then manufacturing bases are equally susceptible to processes occurring 
at European scale and  thus spatial stability is a likely outcome. Moreover, it has been 
predicted that industrial specialisation is bound to be increased eventually, as member 
economies will become more integrated (Krugman, 1991). In this context, the measurement of 
industrial specialisation at state level can be useful in finding out the extent to which these 
assumptions hold. Apart from that, another related theme is that of sectoral localisation. It will 
be interesting to examine whether the interstate variation in the rates of labour decline signals 
any change in the spatial behaviour of individual industries. In other words, whether the 
geographical distribution of sub-sectors has become more concentrated or dispersed. 
 
The provision of some answers to the above questions necessitates the utilisation of additional 
measures, namely the indices of industrial specialisation and sectoral concentration. The 
calculation of these indicators is not dissimilar to that of shift-share components. Instead of 
relying on disparities in employment growth rates, the new measures capture the differences 
in the contribution of every industry or country to overall aggregate employment. 
Consequently, the index of industrial specialisation (Is) is estimated as the half of the sum of 
absolute differences between the shares si and si
* (equation 2). The former symbol denotes the 
contribution of each sector i to total manufacturing employment in a member state, while the 
latter refers to the contribution of the same sector in another country or the EU. The values of 
the indicator range between zero (implying that the industrial structures in question are 
identical) and one (in which case they are poles apart). 
 
(2)  Is = 1/2 Si |si – si
*| 
 
In the same way, the index of sectoral concentration (Ic) is given by equation (3), where ci 
reflects the share of every country i in the total employment of a specific industry at the   13
European scale and ci
* is the national contribution to total EU manufacturing. Again the index 
fluctuates between 0 and 1, however this time low values mean that the spatial distribution of 
the industry follows that of aggregate manufacturing. In contrast, for sectors located in a 
single state, which does not attract any other industry, the index is very close to one. 
 
(3)  Ic = 1/2 Si |ci – ci
*| 
 
The national indices of industrial specialisation for the year 1978 are presented in table 3. 
Following Krugman (1991) the estimations have been carried out for every possible pair of 
member states and the total of the 13 countries (EU 13). In this way the interstate differences 
in industrial structure are calculated accurately without the distortion that spatial disparities in 
the size of manufacturing activity cause when comparisons are made solely in relation to the 
European average.
5 Hence, it is possible to investigate whether neighbouring states or 
economies sharing common attributes are characterised by similar industry mix as well. 
 
The first conclusion that derives from table 3 is that the presumption made earlier about the 
lack of heterogeneity among national manufacturing bases is to a great extent true. The levels 
of specialisation in 1978 were particularly low with just four countries (Greece, Portugal, 
Finland and Denmark) demonstrating values above 0.2 when compared with the average 
European industrial structure. As expected, the index is very close to zero for the large 
economies, especially France (0.061), the UK (0.092) and Germany (0.095). However, what 
is striking is that the same applies to the indices for each pair of these countries (UK-France 
0.08, UK-Germany 0.114, France-Germany 0.106) meaning that their industrial composition 
is almost identical. It is interesting, that Sapir (1996) also reports similar findings, although 
his time coverage (1977-1992), data (trade) and indices (Herfindahl and Lawrence) are 
different to those of the present study. In contrast, the highest deviation from the rest of the 
EU is recorded by Greece (0.277) and Portugal (0.273), presumably due to their strong 
specialisation in traditional manufacturing sectors. Sweden in particular emerges as the most 
distant economy to them with scores 0.414 vis-à-vis Greece and 0.402 against Portugal. 
 
In addition to the above, another important finding is that ‘geography matters’. The indices of 
specialisation tend to be lower between bordering states or economies of comparable 
magnitude. Thus, in the Mediterranean, manufacturing structures are quite homogeneous with 
values ranging from 0.124 (Italy-Spain) to 0.239 (Greece-Italy). The same appears to be the   14
case in the Nordic region where the deviation from the EU average is stronger. Finland for 
instance, is closer to Sweden (0.21) and Denmark (0.225) than any other member state. 
Equally, countries such as Austria, Belgium or the Netherlands specialise in common sectors 
with their neighbours. The index of specialisation between them and Germany is less than 
0.17. Finally, it is evident that Italy and Spain share reasonably similar industrial structures 
with other large economies (the maximum score is 0.229 for Spain-UK). 
 
A cursory glance at the data of table 4 reveals that the previous findings continue to hold in 
1996 as well. Geographic proximity and size remain the factors that iron out disparities in 
industrial composition, while the level of spatial variation remains relatively limited. 
However, as Krugman (1991) predicted and several empirical studies (Sapir, 1996; Amiti, 
1999; Begg et al, 1999) utilising different indicators argued, specialisation has increased. In 
the majority of countries (Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK are the 
exceptions) the index of specialisation in relation to the EU 13 is higher in 1996 than 1978. 
Nonetheless, most values remain below 0.2, while only Greece (0.326) and Portugal (0.289) 
exhibit a substantial score. Moreover, the indices for each pair of countries continue to be 
lower when the economies in question are of comparable magnitude or spatially proximate. 
Hence, Germany, France and the UK are still characterised by fairly similar manufacturing 
structures (the maximum score is 0.137 for France-Germany). The same can be said, although 
to a lesser degree (the indices are approximately double there), about the Mediterranean and 
Nordic regions. Even in Greece and Portugal, the most deviating states, the indicator grows 
slowly and in 1996 does not exceed the 0.5 mark (0.485 and 0.431 respectively in relation to 
Sweden). 
 
Consequently, it could be argued that despite the rise of specialisation indices, several 
national industrial structures still demonstrate a remarkable level of homogeneity. This entails 
that processes taking place at the wider European scale will continue to have the largest 
impact upon labour outcomes in the near future. Nevertheless, the slow but gradual 
differentiation of manufacturing bases, which is also confirmed here, may eventually put an 
end to this situation. The precise effects that such an evolution could have on the geography 
of manufacturing employment are not yet clear. However, it is logical to expect that sectoral 
localisation will become more intense as state specialisation escalates. 
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The last argument is supported by the results in table 5. The index of sectoral concentration 
increased in 21 out of 28 industries during the period 1978-1996. Nonetheless, this evolution 
was not enough to alter location patterns. In 1996 no less than 20 sub-sectors displayed values 
below 0.2, suggesting that their spatial distribution was proximate to that of aggregate 
manufacturing. Among them were several key industries, including metal products (0.054), 
non-electrical machinery (0.09), electrical machinery (0.132) and transport equipment 
(0.117), which one might anticipate to be heavily concentrated in few countries. In contrast, it 
was traditional activities, such as footwear (0.396), petroleum & coal products
6 (0.366), 
pottery & china (0.329), leather products (0.318), tobacco (0.296), textiles (0.284) and 
wearing apparel (0.255) that emerged as the most localised, although once more the scores 
were not extreme. 
 
The inevitable question that arises from these results is whether there is a link between the 
higher localisation tendencies of traditional sectors and the increased industrial specialisation 
of southern economies. The examination of national shares in sectoral employment (not 
presented here) reveals that traditional activities are not only largely concentrated in the South 
but also this concentration has been enhanced between the years 1978 and 1996. According to 
the 1996 data, in the case of footwear Italy and Portugal account for 43.3% and 14.9% of total 
employment, while in pottery & china their contribution is only slightly lower (38.9% and 
13.3% respectively). Similarly, the majority of the EU labour force in leather products is 
located in Italy (38.3%) and Spain (16%). The same can be suggested for textiles and wearing 
apparel, where the combined share of Italy and the two Iberian countries exceeds 54% and 
52%. Finally, Greece (11.7%), Italy (26.3%) and Spain (10.4%) have exceptionally large 
shares of the tobacco industry. 
 
Hence, the rising specialisation of southern states is associated with their better employment 
record in traditional industries that shed labour elsewhere more severely. The stronger 
resistance of these sectors in the South can be attributed to local conditions (lower wages, 
participation of the extended family in the production, lack of alternative employment 
opportunities etc.). However, the localisation trends are also intensified due to the fact that 
countries such as Greece or Portugal do not attract a significant amount of other 
manufacturing. Advanced sectors, irrespective of their low values in the relevant index, are 
also concentrated in only a limited number of member states. Nonetheless, these states happen 
to be the largest in the EU (France, Germany, the UK, plus Italy and Spain) and thus the   16
geographical dispersion of advanced manufacturing is bound to resemble that of total 
manufacturing. (Recall that these five countries account for 4/5 of the employment in total 
manufacturing.) In this sense, it would be a mistake to assume that the effects of European 
integration have been more notable in the traditional industrial segment. Similarly, the higher 
localisation tendencies of this segment also pose hardly any threat to the present map of 
manufacturing distribution in the foreseeable future. 
 
5 Conclusions 
Summarising the key findings of this paper, it can be said that despite the acceleration of the 
integration process over the past twenty years, the geography of manufacturing employment 
in Europe has remained really rather stable. In most countries the total shift from the negative 
EU labour trends is limited, suggesting that processes operating at European scale are perhaps 
the main driving forces behind employment outcomes. The impact of industrial structure is 
surprisingly low and the moderate interstate variation in the competitive effect stems not from 
the creation of new jobs in some member states but from milder rates of decline (especially in 
the small economies and the South). Furthermore, it is interesting that the migration 
movements of manufacturing activity across Europe, at least in terms of employment 
dynamics, appear to be insubstantial. Leaving aside the fact that few industries generate new 
jobs in any given country, employment gains are usually negligible in comparison to losses. 
 
Undoubtedly, the spatially uniform labour trends are largely attributable to the homogeneity 
of several national industrial bases. The values of the industrial specialisation indicator are 
rather small among neighbouring states and large economies, while the majority of sub-
sectors display a geographical distribution that is fairly close to that of aggregate 
manufacturing. The slow increase in the specialisation of member economies and the 
localisation tendencies of a few traditional sectors over the period 1978-1996, although 
expected, are unlikely to affect substantially the existing industrial geography in the near 
future. 
 
These findings raise an interesting set of questions that deserve some discussion. The first 
concerns the causes of spatial inertia. The eradication of internal borders and the free 
movement of production factors have already radically altered the environment i n which 
member states strive to achieve economic growth. However, their impact on the European 
map of manufacturing employment is not visible so far. There are several possible   17
explanations for this. One might argue that the integration process is not completed yet. The 
Monetary Union is still in an early phase. There are states that entered the EU in the mid-
nineties and the Single Market has a lifetime of less than a decade. Although this is a valid 
argument, it should be noted that the integration process was launched almost five decades 
ago. Early custom agreements, initiatives to facilitate the flow of goods and people across the 
EEC or mutual tariff reductions have paved the way for the more decisive steps taken in the 
eighties and nineties. Similarly, the ties of the newer member states with the EU date back 
many years before their official entry. Thus, by now some of the side effects, if there are any, 
should be apparent. 
 
The survival of many ‘natural’ trade barriers after 1992 is another likely cause of spatial 
stability. According to Krugman and Venables (1990; 1996) factors such as transportation 
costs, difficulty of communication and cultural differences will continue to prevent the EU 
reaching the integration levels of the US. Apart from that, economies of scale may in fact be 
powerless to reverse, in the short term, the geographical effects of historical accidents 
(national borders, protectionism, etc.). If this is true, then industrial specialisation or sectoral 
localisation will take a long time to become prominent features of the European 
manufacturing landscape. Last, but not least, the absence of radical changes can be also 
attributed to the dynamic interplay between factors that promote the shift of industrial activity 
to the periphery (lower wages for instance) and factors that reinforce the dominance of the EU 
core (market accessibility, etc.). In this case, it will be interesting to see when these opposite 
forces will begin to move out of balance. 
 
The second question is related to the policy implications of the results. The main consequence 
of the preservation of the current status quo is that the disparities between advanced and 
lagging economies continue to hold. However, given that the distribution of manufacturing 
employment resembles more or less that of population, this is not so much of a problem. On 
the contrary, from a policy viewpoint the absence of winners and losers can be seen as a 
positive outcome, as it deprives the self-appointed champions of national interests of the 
argument that European integration harms the industrial performance of their country. A rapid 
elimination of inequalities at this stage could have been easily subject to political exploitation 
of this kind, effectively blocking the evolution of the EU into a solid economic entity. 
Moreover, the results implicitly provide reassurance for existing and prospective member   18
states that the imminent EU enlargement is unlikely to affect adversely the relative 
competitiveness of their manufacturing bases. 
 
The third and f inal question regards the impact of industrial specialisation and sectoral 
localisation on the convergence process. The slow but gradual differentiation of national 
manufacturing structures has the potential to increase disparities in income per capita levels 
across Europe in the long run, since southern economies become more dependent in 
traditional activities. Nevertheless, divergence is not the only possible outcome. One of the 
main benefits of the Single Market is the opportunity offered to member states to specialise 
further in sectors where they have a comparative advantage. Even if these sectors, are mature 
there are advantages to be gained from specialising in them. The capture of the dynamic and 
quality-driven EU market presupposes improvements in terms of labour skills, technology, 
and production organisation. The implementation of such qualitative changes in mature 
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1 GDP purchase power parities (PPPs) are a favourite in many studies. Although PPPs are a suitable conversion 
factor for fixed capital stock (Van Ark, 1990) the same does not apply to manufacturing output. This happens 
because PPPs are measures of final expenditure prices. From this viewpoint, they are not industry specific and do 
not reflect relative producer prices. This is not so much a problem in sectors where a large proportion of the 
output is destined for final consumption, but it causes difficulties in manufacturing where many goods are sold to 
other industries. Unit value ratios (UVRs) are a better conversion factor since they represent producer prices and 
remain more stable over time (O’ Mahony, 1996). However, they do also suffer from major drawbacks such as 
the limited sample of goods in which they are based or the inability to account for spatial differences in product 
quality (Van Ark, 1995; Hooper, 1996; O’ Mahony, 1996). 
2 Although the interpolated values cannot be entirely accurate, the deviation from the actual figures is unlikely to 
be substantial. The estimations cover a short period, while they derive from disaggregated labour data at 2-digit 
ISIC level. Thus, in Austria, for instance, employment in the tobacco industry (3140) for the year 1996 has been 
calculated in relation to the actual number of jobs in the food, beverages & tobacco sector (31) in the same year. 
Furthermore, the utilisation of the dynamic shift-share model ensures that the limited use of interpolated data 
affects only marginally the long run structural and differential components. Their values derive from adding up 
18 annual estimations and not from comparing industrial structures and growth rates between the base and end 
year. 
3 The impact of the EU component for the entire period varies marginally among the participating countries, 
although annually is the same everywhere. This happens because employment levels do not remain constant over 
time. Thus, depending on whether national industrial bases shed significant amounts of labour earlier or later in 
the period, the EU effect fluctuates slightly from the weighted average of the 13 states (22.9%). 
4 Keeble (1989) reports considerable differences in the manufacturing structure of ‘inner central’ and ‘outer 
peripheral’ EU regions for 1983. The relevant index (based on the ratio of employment in modern industries to 
that in traditional industries) tended to be three times higher in the former areas. Nevertheless, the disparities 
between ‘intermediate’ (they accounted for 62 out of 166 EU12 spatial units) and ‘inner central’ areas were less   19
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
than 20 percent. 
5 By definition larger economies will be closer to this average since their contribution to aggregate figures is 
several times higher to that of smaller countries. Moreover, the industrial structures of states displaying similar 
values of specialisation in relation to the EU 13 may in fact be less homogeneous than it is evident at a first 
glance (see for example the Netherlands and Sweden in table 3). 
6 The high values of the index for petroleum & coal products can be partially attributed to data deficiencies. 
According to the OECD (1998) STAN database for industrial analysis there was not a single person engaged in 
this activity in France and Portugal. Nevertheless, a closer look on labour figures confirms that the industry is to 
some extent localised, as Italy, Spain and the UK accounted in 1996 for 62% of the total EU employment in the 
sector.   21
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Figure 1 Distribution of population (1994 figures) and manufacturing employment (1978 and 
1996 figures) among the EU states   25
Table 1. Dynamic shift-share analysis of manufacturing employment change in the European 
Union, 1978-1996 
    As % 1978 Employment 
States  1978 employment 
(000s) 




Austria     899  -23.8  -23.2  -1.2     0.6 
Belgium      969  -30.0  -21.5  -1.7    -6.8 
Denmark     500    -1.0  -24.8   5.4   18.3 
Finland     520  -24.0  -23.9   2.0    -2.1 
France  5,555  -28.6  -22.2   0.8    -7.2 
Germany  8,906  -15.5  -25.2   0.9     8.7 
Greece      371  -19.5  -23.9  -5.5     9.8 
Italy  5,793  -21.8  -23.5  -3.1     4.8 
Netherlands  1,042  -16.4  -23.5   4.2      2.9 
Portugal  1,119    -7.5  -25.8  -6.2   24.5 
Spain  3,357  -23.3  -21.7  -1.1    -0.5 
Sweden  1,000  -18.6  -22.7   2.8     1.3 
United Kingdom  7,427  -32.3  -20.0   1.3  -13.7 
EU 13  37,459  -22.9       
           
Large 
Economies 
31,038  -23.9  -22.7   0.0   -1.2 
Small 
Economies 
6,421  -17.9  -23.6  -0.1    5.8 
           
North  26,818  -23.7  -22.7   1.2   -2.1 
South  10,641  -20.7  -23.2  -2.9    5.4 
Note: Detail may not add to total due to rounding. 
 
Table 2. Manufacturing sectors recording employment gains in the European Union, 1978-
1996 
States  Number of sectors  Sectors 
ISIC Rev.2 
Job gains as percentage of 
total employment loss 
Austria   3  3320, 3530, 3820    1.28 
Belgium    2  3560, 3850    1.97 
Denmark  10  3310, 3320, 3510, 3520, 3540, 
3560, 3810, 3820, 3850, 3900 
90.90 
Finland   5  3520, 3540, 3810, 3830, 3850  14.52 
France   2  3420, 3560    1.20 
Germany   3  3420, 3560, 3720    7.39 
Greece   7  311/2, 3140, 3320, 3420, 3530, 
3690, 3720 
  7.06 
Italy   4  3530, 3540, 3560, 3610    3.57 
Netherlands   4  3420, 3520, 3560, 3900    9.24 
Portugal  10  3220, 3240, 3320, 3420, 3560, 
3610, 3810, 3830, 3850, 3900 
49.52 
Spain   2  3420, 3560    3.65 
Sweden   6  3420, 3520, 3560, 3810, 3850, 
3900 
18.31 
United Kingdom   3  3320, 3420, 3560    4.97 
EU 13   2  3420, 3560    3.09 
       
Large Economies   2  3420, 3560    3.43 
Small Economies   5  3520, 3560, 3610, 3850, 3900    4.83 
       
North   2  3420, 3560    3.57 
South   3  3420, 3560, 3610    2.54 
Note: The classification description of manufacturing sectors is provided in table 5.   26
Table 3 Indices of industrial specialisation 1978 
States  Austria  Belgium   Denmark  Finland  France  Germany  Greece  Italy  Netherlands  Portugal  Spain  Sweden  UK  EU 13 
Austria    0.129  0.225  0.249  0.153  0.163  0.283  0.168  0.203  0.262  0.165  0.245  0.183  0.114 
Belgium       0.257  0.265  0.160  0.163  0.272  0.177  0.200  0.268  0.168  0.240  0.181  0.127 
Denmark        0.225  0.231  0.242  0.296  0.254  0.161  0.300  0.200  0.249  0.222  0.213 
Finland          0.234  0.273  0.315  0.265  0.238  0.309  0.238  0.210  0.251  0.222 
France            0.106  0.303  0.195  0.194  0.308  0.178  0.175  0.080  0.061 
Germany              0.340  0.215  0.167  0.345  0.225  0.180  0.114  0.095 
Greece                0.239  0.314  0.137  0.197  0.414  0.330  0.277 
Italy                  0.245  0.208  0.124  0.292  0.224  0.146 
Netherlands                    0.342  0.247  0.229  0.206  0.182 
Portugal                      0.160  0.402  0.357  0.273 
Spain                        0.274  0.229  0.148 
Sweden                          0.150  0.176 
UK                            0.092 
 
 
Table 4 Indices of industrial specialisation 1996 
States  Austria  Belgium   Denmark  Finland  France  Germany  Greece  Italy  Netherlands  Portugal  Spain  Sweden  UK  EU 13 
Austria    0.172  0.226  0.205  0.175  0.161  0.336  0.224  0.198  0.287  0.203  0.263  0.177  0.132 
Belgium       0.256  0.248  0.156  0.197  0.316  0.230  0.187  0.291  0.146  0.272  0.186  0.121 
Denmark        0.226  0.233  0.260  0.362  0.283  0.172  0.342  0.217  0.251  0.214  0.218 
Finland          0.195  0.201  0.425  0.299  0.175  0.385  0.273  0.140  0.149  0.172 
France            0.137  0.346  0.267  0.149  0.359  0.169  0.197  0.101  0.096 
Germany              0.410  0.274  0.187  0.390  0.242  0.200  0.128  0.125 
Greece                0.283  0.336  0.239  0.248  0.485  0.369  0.326 
Italy                  0.263  0.187  0.212  0.326  0.254  0.185 
Netherlands                    0.371  0.219  0.223  0.162  0.158 
Portugal                      0.226  0.431  0.362  0.289 
Spain                        0.281  0.199  0.133 
Sweden                          0.175  0.204 
UK                            0.086 
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Table 5 Indices of sectoral concentration 
ISIC Rev.2  Sectors/Year  1978  1984  1990  1996 
311/2  Food  0.084  0.090  0.105  0.103 
3130  Beverages  0.124  0.131  0.137  0.140 
3140  Tobacco  0.211  0.254  0.290  0.296 
3210  Textiles  0.193  0.225  0.244  0.284 
3220  Wearing Apparel  0.122  0.159  0.215  0.255 
3230  Leather & Products  0.160  0.231  0.292  0.318 
3240  Footwear  0.273  0.324  0.365  0.396 
3310  Wood Products  0.182  0.164  0.163  0.139 
3320  Furniture & Fixtures  0.149  0.137  0.125  0.120 
3410  Paper & Products  0.120  0.133  0.118  0.108 
3420  Printing & Publishing  0.146  0.173  0.179  0.182 
3510  Industrial Chemicals  0.107  0.112  0.114  0.123 
3520  Other Chemicals  0.054  0.084  0.075  0.084 
3530  Petroleum Refineries  0.138  0.119  0.180  0.153 
3540  Petroleum & Coal Products  0.404  0.381  0.379  0.366 
3550  Rubber Products  0.087  0.072  0.087  0.117 
3560  Plastic Products, nec  0.059  0.073  0.083  0.096 
3610  Pottery, China etc  0.163  0.222  0.318  0.329 
3620  Glass & Products  0.092  0.117  0.130  0.121 
3690  Non-Metallic Products, nec  0.156  0.133  0.145  0.138 
3710  Iron & Steel  0.136  0.139  0.170  0.159 
3720  Non-Ferrous Metals  0.163  0.173  0.212  0.232 
3810  Metal Products  0.062  0.069  0.055  0.054 
3820  Non-Electrical Machinery  0.092  0.079  0.083  0.090 
3830  Electrical Machinery  0.098  0.123  0.139  0.132 
3840  Transport Equipment  0.111  0.114  0.111  0.117 
3850  Professional Goods  0.167  0.184  0.177  0.170 
3900  Other Manufacturing  0.139  0.173  0.189  0.195 
 
 